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Abstract 
 
Like many other assets, housing prices are quite volatile relative to observable changes 
in fundamentals.  If we are going to understand boom-bust housing cycles, we must 
incorporate housing supply.  In this paper, we present a simple model of housing bubbles 
which predicts that places with more elastic housing supply have fewer and shorter bubbles, 
with smaller price increases.  However, the welfare consequences of bubbles may actually be 
higher in more elastic places because those places will overbuild more in response to a bubble.  
The data show that the price run-ups of the 1980s were almost exclusively experienced in 
cities where housing supply is more inelastic.  More elastic places had slightly larger increases 
in building during that period.  Over the past five years, a modest number of more elastic 
places also experienced large price booms, but as the model suggests, these booms seem to 
have been quite short.  Prices are already moving back towards construction costs in those 
areas.     
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Introduction 
 
 In the 25 years since Shiller (1981) documented that swings in stock prices were 
extremely high relative to changes in dividends, a growing body of papers has suggested that 
asset price movements reflect irrational exuberance as well as fundamentals (DeLong et al., 
1990; Barberis et al., 2001).  A running theme of these papers is that high transactions costs 
and limits on short-selling make it more likely that prices will diverge from fundamentals.  In 
housing markets, transactions costs are higher and short-selling is more difficult than in almost 
any other asset market (e.g., Linneman, 1986; Wallace and Meese, 1994; Rosenthal, 1989).   
Thus, we should not be surprised that the predictability of housing price changes (Case and 
Shiller, 1989) and seemingly large deviations between housing prices and fundamentals create 
few opportunities for arbitrage.   
The extraordinary nature of the recent boom in housing markets has piqued interest in 
this issue, with some claiming there was a bubble (e.g., Shiller, 2005).  While nonlinearities in 
the discounting of rents could lead prices to respond sharply to changes in interest rates in 
particular in certain markets (Himmelberg et al., 2005), it remains difficult to explain the large 
changes in housing prices over time with changes in incomes, amenities or interest rates 
(Glaeser and Gyourko, 2006).  It certainly is hard to know whether house prices in 1996 were 
too low or whether values in 2005 were too high, but it is harder still to explain the rapid rise 
and fall of housing prices with a purely rational model.   
However, the asset pricing literature long ago showed how difficult it is to confirm the 
presence of a bubble (e.g., Flood and Hodrick, 1990).  Our focus here is not on developing 
such a test, but on examining the nature of bubbles, should they exist, in housing markets. 
House price volatility is worthy of careful study in its own right because it does more than just 
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transfer large amounts of wealth between homeowners and buyers.  Price volatility also 
impacts the construction of new homes (Topel and Rosen, 1988), which involves the use of 
real resources that could involve substantial welfare consequences.  When housing prices 
reflect fundamentals, those prices help migrants make appropriate decisions about where to 
live.  If prices, instead, reflect the frothiness of irrational exuberance, then those prices may 
misdirect the migration decisions that collectively drive urban change.   
Most asset bubbles also elicit a supply response, as was the case with the proliferation 
of new internet firms in Silicon Valley in the late 1990s.  Models of housing price volatility 
that ignore supply miss a fundamental part of the housing market.  Not only are changes in 
housing supply among the more important real consequences of housing price changes, but 
housing supply seems likely to help shape the course of any housing bubble.  We show this is, 
indeed, the case in Section II of this paper, where we develop a simple model to investigate 
the interaction between housing bubbles and housing supply.   
The model suggests that rational bubbles can exist when the supply of housing is fixed, 
but not with elastic supply and a finite number of potential homebuyers.  We model irrational, 
exogenous bubbles as a temporary increase in optimism about future prices.  Like any demand 
shock, these bubbles have more of an effect on price and less of an effect on new construction 
where housing supply is more inelastic.  Even though elastic housing supply mutes the price 
impacts of housing bubbles, the social welfare losses of housing bubbles may be higher in 
more elastic areas, since there will be more overbuilding during the bubble.     
 We also endogenize asset bubbles by assuming that home buyers believe that future 
price growth will resemble past price growth.  Supply inelasticity then becomes a crucial 
determinant of the duration of a bubble.   When housing supply is elastic, new construction 
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quickly comes on line as prices rise, which causes the bubble to quickly unravel.  The model 
predicts that building during a bubble causes post-bubble prices to drop below their pre- 
bubble levels.  The impact of housing supply elasticity on the size of the post-bubble drop is 
ambiguous because the more elastic places have more construction during a bubble, but their 
bubbles are shorter.     
 We then examine data on housing prices, new construction and supply elasticity during 
periods of price booms and busts.  While this empirical analysis is not a test for bubbles, much 
of the evidence is consistent with the conclusions of our models.  For readers who resolutely 
do not believe in bubbles, the empirical results in the paper still provide information on the 
nature of housing price volatility across markets with different supply conditions. 
In performing the empirical analysis, we distinguish between areas with more or less 
housing supply elasticity using a new geographical constraint measure developed by Saiz 
(2008).  We also investigate differences in price and quantity behavior between the most 
recent boom and that which occurred in the 1980s.    
 During both the 1980s boom and the post-1996 boom, more inelastic places had much 
larger increases in prices and much smaller increases in new construction.  Indeed, during the 
1980s, there basically was no housing price boom in the elastic areas of the country.  Prices 
stayed close to housing production costs.  If anything, the gap in both price and quantity 
growth between elastic and inelastic areas was even larger during the post-1996 boom than it 
was during the 1980s.  However, in the years since 1996, there were a number of highly elastic 
places (e.g., Orlando and Phoenix) that had temporary price explosions despite no visible 
decline in construction intensity.   
 
 
4
 The fact that highly elastic places had price booms is one of the strange facts about the 
recent price explosion.  Our model does not suggest that bubbles are impossible in more 
elastic areas, but it does imply that they will be quite short, and that is what the data indicate.  
While the average boom in inelastic places lasted for more than four years, the average 
duration of the boom in more elastic areas was 1.7 years.     
 Does the housing bust of 1989-1996 offer some guidance for the post-boom years that 
are ahead of us?  During that period, mean reversion was enormous.  For every percentage 
point of growth in a city’s housing prices between 1982 and 1989, prices declined by 0.33 
percentage points between 1989 and 2006.  The level of mean reversion was more severe in 
more inelastic places, but on average, elasticity was uncorrelated with either price or quantity 
changes during the bust.   
Relatively elastic markets such as Orlando and Phoenix have not experienced sharp 
increases in prices relative to construction costs in the past, so they have no history of 
substantial mean reversion.  Yet some insight into their future price paths might be provided 
by the fact that for two decades leading up to 2002-2003, prices in their markets (and other 
places with elastic supply sides) never varied more than ten to fifteen percent from what we 
estimate to be minimum profitable production costs (MPPC), which is the sum of physical 
production costs, land and land assembly costs, and a normal profit for the homebuilder.  
Those three factors sum to well under $200,000 in these markets.  If these markets return to 
their historical norm of prices matching these costs, then they will experience further sharp 
price declines.  We now turn to the model that frames our empirical work.  
 
II. Housing Bubbles and New Construction: A Simple Framework 
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A small, but growing, financial literature has examined the connection between 
bubbles and asset supply by looking at lock-up provisions (Ofek and Richardson, 2003; Hong 
et al., 2006).  These provisions restrict the ability of asset owners to sell, and when they 
expire, there can be a burst in the supply of shares on the market and a significant drop in 
prices.  In Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006), the number of truly ebullient buyers is 
limited, so the extra supply means that the marginal buyer is much more skeptical and prices 
fall.1   
Apart from this small but important literature, the bulk of the theoretical work on 
bubbles written by financial and monetary economists has assumed that the supply of assets is 
either fixed or determined by a monetary authority.  While this assumption is appropriate for 
some markets, it is not for housing markets, where new homes regularly are built in response 
to rising prices.   In this section, we incorporate housing supply into a simple model of 
housing bubbles.  In doing so, we treat irrational exuberance essentially as an exogenous 
phenomenon, ignoring recent attempts to micro-found overoptimism (Barberis et al., 2001; 
Hong et al., 2008).  We focus on the extent to which supply mutes or exacerbates housing 
bubbles and their welfare impacts.      
We assume a continuous time model where a city’s home prices are determined by the 
intersection of supply and demand.  Demand comes from new homebuyers, whose willingness 
to pay for housing is based on the utility gains from living in the city and expected housing 
price appreciation.  The supply of homes for sale includes new homes produced by developers 
and old homes sold by existing homeowners.  All homes are physically identical.      
                                                 
1 Shleifer’s (1986) work on whether the demand for stocks slopes down can be interpreted as a similar exercise 
showing that extra demand from index funds for a stock causes prices to rise.   
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We differentiate between the stock of housing at time t, which is denoted )(tH , and the 
supply of homes for sale at that time period, which is denoted )(tS .  The supply of homes for 
sale at time t combines the flow of new construction, denoted )(tI , and older homes being put 
on the market by their owners.  The supply of new homes is determined by developers, and we 
assume that the marginal cost of development equals )(10 tIcc + .  This linear production cost 
reflects the possibility that there are scarce inputs into housing production, so that the cost of 
production rises linearly with the amount of production.2   Ideally, we would model the 
decision of existing owners to sell as an optimization problem, but this would greatly 
complicate the model.  To simplify, we assume that each current homeowner receives a 
Poisson-distributed shock with probabilityλ  in each period that forces the homeowner to sell, 
leave the area and receive zero utility for the rest of time.  Homeowners who do not receive 
the shock do not put their homes on the market.  While convenient, not allowing homeowners 
to time their sale abstracts from potentially important aspects of housing bubbles.3  Even 
though each individual homeowner’s decision to sell is stochastic, we assume a continuum of 
homeowners, so the number of existing homes for sale at time t is deterministic, proportional 
to the existing stock of homes and equal to )(tHλ . 
For the housing market to be in equilibrium, price (denoted )(tP ) must equal 
construction costs whenever there is new construction.  The level of new homes for sale at 
time t therefore equals the maximum of zero and ( ) 10 /)( cctP − . 
 Ours is an open city model in which demand comes from a steady flow of new buyers 
who are interested in moving into the city.  At every point in time, there is a distribution of 
                                                 
2 We could also assume that production costs rise with the stock of housing in the area, but this only adds 
unnecessary complications.   
3 However, Glaeser and Gyourko (2008) conclude the risk aversion limits the ability of consumers to arbitrage 
prices by delaying the sales of their homes.   
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risk-neutral buyers who are willing to purchase a home in the city if the expected utility gain 
from living in the city plus the expected returns when they sell exceeds the price of the house.  
Consumers have no option to delay purchase; they either buy at time t or live outside of the 
city for eternity.  We normalize the utility flow outside of the city to equal zero.  Inside the 
city, individual i receives a time-invariant flow of utility denominated in dollars equal to )(iu , 
until that person receives a shock that forces them to sell.   
We further assume that, at all points of time, there is a distribution of )(iu  among a 
fixed number of potential buyers.  Some people greatly benefit from living in the city, while 
others gain less.4  Across buyers, the utility from living in the city, )(iu , is distributed 
uniformly with density 
1
1
v
 on the interval ],[ 0vu .  At any point in time, there is a marginal 
buyer.  Individuals whose utility flow from living in the city is greater than that of the 
marginal buyer will purchase a home, while individuals whose utility flow from living in the 
city is less than the marginal buyer will not.  If the utility flow from the marginal buyer at time 
t is denoted )(* tu , then the number of buyers will equal
1
0 )(*
v
tuv −
.  This represents the level 
of demand, D(t).   Alternatively, we can invert the equation and write that the utility flow to 
the marginal buyer equals )(10 tDvv − .   
While the utility from living in the area is time invariant, buyers do recognize that at 
each future date they will sell their homes with probabilityλ and then receive the sales price of 
the house.  Individuals who bought at time t understand that with probability je λ−−1 they will 
                                                 
4 In the financial economics literature, it is less natural to assume that there is a heterogeneous demand for an 
asset.  Instead, heterogeneity is more likely to come from differences in beliefs among investers (Hong et al., 
2006).   
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have sold their house and left the city by time t+j .  This forward-looking aspect of the model 
means that the current willingness-to-pay for housing will reflect expectations of future prices.    
We assume that an individual making decisions at time t discounts future cash or utility 
flows at time t+j with a standard discount factor rje− , where r is the interest rate.  The expected 
utility flow from someone who receives utility )(iu  from living in the city is then given by 
)()()( ))(( tPdxxPeE
r
iu
tx
txr
t −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛++ ∫
∞
=
−+− λλλ , where ( ).tE  reflects expectations as of time t.  If 
there is construction, the overall equilibrium in the housing market at time t satisfies:  
(1) ))()(()()(
)(
10
))((10 tHtScctPdxxPeE
r
tDvv
tx
txr
t λλλ
λ −+==⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛++
− ∫∞= −+− ,  
where )()( tStD = .  Equation (1) represents a system of two equations (the consumer’s and 
developer’s indifference relations) and two unknowns (P(t) and D(t)).  This system can be 
solved as a function of the current stock of housing H(t) and expected future prices.     
Rational, self-sustaining bubbles can satisfy the demand equation if there is no 
building.  For example, if D(t) equals a constant, D, and there is no construction, then the first 
half of equation (1) will be satisfied at all t, if P(t) equals rtke
r
Dvv +− 10 , where k represents 
an indeterminate constant of integration.  The component rtke  represents a “rational” bubble, 
where continuously rising prices justify continuously rising prices.  When supply is fixed, 
stochastic bubbles are also possible.5    
While rational bubbles are compatible with a fixed housing supply, they cannot exist 
with elastic housing supply and a finite number of potential homebuyers: 
                                                 
5There could be a bubble that ends with probabilityδ at each point in time, which survives with probability je δ−  
for each period t+j, where prices equal trke
r
Dvv )(10 δ++−  during the bubble and then fall to  
r
Dvv 10 − after 
the bubble ends.        
 
 
9
 
Proposition 1:   If housing supply is elastic and the mass of potential buyers at each time t is 
finite, then there is no equilibrium where at any time t, ε+>+ 0)( cjtP , for all positive j and 
for any finite ε . (All proofs are in the appendix).   
  
Perpetually rising prices means a perpetually rising housing supply, which eventually 
means there are more homes being offered than there are potential customers in the market.   
The result in the proposition hinges on our assumption of linear production costs, which 
implies that there is no cap on the number of homes that could be produced.   However, we do 
not need such an elastic supply of housing to rule out rational bubbles.  Rational bubbles 
cannot exist if the supply of housing, given high enough prices, is greater than the maximum 
possible number of buyers.  Hence, we will turn our attention to irrational bubbles, but before 
doing so, we discuss the equilibrium without irrationality.     
In a perfectly rational world where supply rules out rational bubbles, the value of H(t) 
determines whether the city is growing or stagnant.  If λ1
00)(
v
rcv
tH
−≥ , then prices will be 
constant at 
r
tHvv )(10 λ− ,  which is less than 0c , and there will be no construction.  
If λ1
00)(
v
rcv
tH
−< , then construction will equal jetH
v
rcv γ
λγ
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −− )(
1
00  at each date t+j, where 
r
vcr
vrr 5.
)(
)(
25.
11
12 −++
++= λ
λλγ .6    Hereafter, we assume that λ1
00)(
v
rcv
tH
−<  so that the 
                                                 
6The total housing stock, H(t+j) will equal ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+ −− λ
γγ
1
000)1()(
v
rcva
etHe jj , and the amount of housing 
on sale at any point in time is given by ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−+−−−+ − )()(
1
000
1
000 tH
v
rcva
e
v
rcva j
λγλ
γ .     
 
 
10
city is growing.   At time t, the expected price at time t+j will equal 
jetH
v
rcva
cc γλγ
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−++ )(
1
000
10 , and we define this as )(, jtP tR + .   
 
Irrational Bubbles 
We now turn to less rational bubbles.   We model such bubbles as a temporary burst of 
irrational exuberance by buyers about future prices.  We do not require that everyone share 
this overoptimism, since there is no way of selling housing short in the model.  Development 
occurs instantaneously and reflects current, rather than future, prices so we can remain 
agnostic about whether developers perceive the bubble in progress.  The bubble acts much like 
any other short-run increase to demand.  Prices and construction levels temporarily rise and 
then fall below equilibrium levels because of the extra housing built during the boom.   
 We begin by assuming that irrational bubbles represent a completely exogenous burst 
of overoptimism about future prices that will last for a fixed period of time.  Buyers do not 
know that they are being influenced by a bubble.   Equation (1) continues to hold, as long as  
( ).tE  is interpreted not as the rational expectation of future prices, but rather the bubble-
influenced expectation.   
One method of introducing a bubble is to assume that buyers take today’s prices and 
just have some optimistic rule of thumb about the future.  We will investigate a model of this 
form in the next section.  In this section, we treat bubbles as an exogenous overestimate of 
prices relative to the rational expectations equilibrium.  Under some circumstances, this 
exogenous overestimate might be justified by overoptimistic extrapolation, but that will not 
generally be the case.   
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If )(, jtP tR +  represents the correct expectation of future prices in the rational 
expectations equilibrium, then during the bubble people believe that future prices will equal 
)(, jtP tR +  plus some added quantity.   Technically, we assume that during a bubble people 
overestimate the total value of ∫∞= −+−tx txr dxxPe )())(( λ , relative to the rational expectations 
equilibrium, by λ
θ
+r
t)( .   For example, this would be satisfied if people believe future prices 
will equal jtR etr
rjtP φθλ
φλ )()(, +
−+++ , but  this is only one of many possibilities.  The exact 
nature of buyers’ beliefs is not critical for our purpose, as long as they believe that 
∫∞= −+−tx txr dxxPe )())(( λ  equals λθλ ++∫
∞
=
−+−
r
tdxxPe
tx tR
txr )()(,
))(( . 
This error about future prices will then impact prices at time t, but the extent of this 
influence depends on the elasticity of supply.  If there were no supply response, then over-
optimism will raise prices by λ  times λ
θ
+r
t)( .  As mobility (λ ) increases, the impact of 
incorrect future beliefs rises because more mobility causes people to care more about the 
future.  Allowing a construction response will mute the price impact of overoptimism because 
added supply means that the marginal buyer has a lower utility benefit from living in the city.  
In a growing city that experiences a bubble, prices at time t will equal the rational expectations 
price, ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−++ )(
1
000
10 tHv
rcva
cc λγ , plus 11
1
)(
)(
vcr
tc
++ λ
θλ .  The price impact of the bubble 
increases with mobility and the inelasticity of supply ( 1c ), and decreases with the 
heterogeneity of preferences ( 1v ).   
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 Our next two propositions consider the impact of an exogenous bubble where θθ =)(t  
for the period t to t+k and then equals zero thereafter.  Proposition 2 describes the general 
impact of the bubble on prices, investment and the housing stock.  Proposition 3 examines the 
interaction between the bubble and housing supply elasticity.  Recall that we assume 
λ1
00)(
v
rcv
tH
−< , so the city is growing:  
Proposition 2:   During the bubble, an increase in θ  causes prices, investment and the 
housing stock to increase.  The impact on prices and investment becomes weaker over the 
course of the bubble, but the impact on the housing stock increases over the course of the 
bubble.  When the bubble is over, higher values of θ  decrease housing prices and investment, 
and increase the housing stock.  
 
During the period of the bubble (or any demand boost), there is a surge in prices and 
new housing construction.  Since the bubble’s magnitude is fixed during its duration, the price 
and development impact of the bubble actually declines over time as new housing is built, but 
this implication will disappear below when we assume that beliefs are fueled by the 
experience of price growth.   
When the bubble ends, housing prices fall below what they would have been if the 
bubble had not happened.  The price crash represents both the end of the overoptimism and the 
extra supply that was built during the high price bubble period.  The extra supply of housing 
results in lower prices and construction levels ex post.  Unsurprisingly, longer bubbles have a 
larger impact.  Our primary interest, however, is in the interaction between the bubble and 
housing supply, which is the subject of Proposition 3:  
 
Proposition 3:  (a) During a bubble, higher values of 1c -- a more inelastic housing supply-- 
will increase the impact of θ  on prices.  Higher values of 1c will decrease the impact that θ  
has on total housing investment during the boom.     
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 (b) After the bubble is over, higher values of 1c  will reduce the adverse impact that 
the bubble has on price levels when 1c is sufficiently high, and will increase the impact that the 
bubble has on prices when 1c  is sufficiently low.   If the bubble is sufficiently long, then 
higher values of 1c  increase the negative impact that the bubble has on price levels once it has 
burst.    
   
Part (a) of Proposition 3 details the impact that more inelastic housing supply 
(reflected in higher values of 1c ) has on the bubble during its duration.  When housing supply 
is more inelastic, the bubble will have a larger impact on price and a smaller impact on the 
housing stock.  The impact of 1c  on the flow of investment depends on the stage of the bubble.  
Early in the bubble, places with more elastic housing supply will see more new construction in 
response to the bubble.  Over time, however, the housing investment response to the bubble 
will actually be lower in places where supply is more elastic because there has already been so 
much new building in those markets.   
The interaction between an exogenous bubble and supply inelasticity is quite similar to 
the connection between elasticity and any exogenous shift in demand.  During the time the 
bubble is raging, more inelastic places will have a larger shift in prices and will also 
experience a sharper reduction in prices when the bubble ends.  More elastic places will have a 
larger increase in new construction, at least during the early stages of the bubble, and will 
always experience a larger increase in total housing stock from the bubble.7      
Part (b) of the proposition discusses the impact of housing elasticity on prices when the 
bubble is over. The post-bubble impact on prices can either be larger or smaller in places with 
more inelastic housing supply because there are two effects that go in opposite directions.  
                                                 
7 One of the counter-factual elements in this model is that prices and investment drop suddenly at the end of the 
bubble rather than declining gradually, as they generally do in the real world.  The price drop at the end of the 
bubble will be larger in more inelastic places with higher values of 1c .  Higher values of 1c moderate the decline 
in new construction at the moment when the bubble ends. 
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First, places with more elastic housing build more homes in response to the bubble.  These 
extra homes act to reduce price levels when the bubble is over.  Second, the impact of extra 
homes on prices will be lower in places where housing supply is more elastic.  Either effect 
can dominate, so it is unclear whether the price hangover from a housing bubble is more 
severe in places where supply is more or less elastic.  
  Just as more elastic housing supply can either increase or decrease the impact of the 
bubble on ex post prices, more elastic housing supply can either increase or decrease the 
welfare consequences of a bubble.  Abstracting from the impacts that bubbles might have on 
savings decisions or on risk averse consumers, the inefficiency of a housing bubble comes 
from the misallocation of real resources—that is, the overbuilding of an area.  This 
overbuilding will be more severe in places where housing supply is more elastic.     
 We can calculate the expected welfare loss for a bubble that occurs only at period t, so 
that buyers during that time period overestimate future prices, but no one after them makes 
that same mistake.  In that case, the number of people who buy housing at period t equals 
111
000
)(
)()()(
vcr
ttH
v
rcvatH +++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−++ λ
λθ
λγλ , which equals the share of people who would 
have bought housing absent the bubble plus 
11)(
)(
vcr
t
++ λ
λθ .  The total welfare loss is found by 
adding consumer welfare for the consumers who bought during that time period minus 
development costs, or 
11
22
)(
)(
vcr
t
++− λ
θλ .  This is decreasing in 1c .  More inelastic markets will 
have bigger price swings in response to a bubble, but the welfare losses will be smaller, since 
there is less of a construction and mobility response.  
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 The parallel of this in the real world is that if there is a housing bubble in a very 
inelastic market such as greater Boston, prices may swing a lot, but there will be little change 
in migration or construction patterns.  If there is a housing bubble in a more elastic area such 
as Phoenix and Orlando, then many thousands of extra homes will be built and many people 
will make migration mistakes.     
  
Self-Reinforcing Bubbles and Adaptive Expectations 
 The conclusion that greater resource misallocation results from overbuilding in more 
elastic places assumes that the magnitude of the bubble is independent of housing elasticity.   
However, if bubbles are endogenous and sustained by rising prices, then more inelastic places 
might have bigger and longer bubbles, because rising demand is more likely to translate into 
rising prices in those markets.  To examine this possibility, we assume that bubbles take the 
form of an irrational belief that prices will continue to rise at a fixed rate for all eternity.   
We continue to work with our continuous time model, but we now assume that 
individuals update their beliefs only at discrete intervals.  For example, if the bubble begins at 
time period t, then between period t and period t+1, individuals have exogenously come to the 
view that future prices will increases perpetually so that buyers believe that )( jtP + will equal 
jtP •+ ε)(  for all j.    While this hybrid discrete-continuous time set-up is somewhat unusual, 
it is inspired by a financial econometrics literature examining settings where researchers only 
observe a continuous time process at discrete intervals (Hansen and Scheinkman, 1995).     
At time period t+1, individuals update their beliefs and base them on price growth 
between period t and t+1.  Between time periods t+1 and t+2, people extrapolate from price 
growth between period t and t+1 and believe that )( jtP +  will equal 
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)1())1()2(()1( −•+−+++ jtPtPtP for all j.  At every subsequent period t+x, where x is an 
integer, updating again occurs.  As long as prices continue to rise between period t+x and 
t+x+1, buyers believe that future prices, )( jtP + , will equal 
)()1()(()( xjxtPxtPxtP −•−+−+++ .8   The future growth in price is assumed to equal 
the growth rate during the period between the last two integer time periods.  We let g(t) denote 
the expected future growth rate at time t.   
As soon as price declines for one period, beliefs revert to rationality and the 
equilibrium returns to the rational expectations equilibrium with, of course, an extra supply of 
housing.  If prices grow by less than they did the period before, prices will start to fall, and we 
will refer to this as the end of the bubble.   
 We will normalize the date of the start of the bubble to be zero and assume that the city 
has reached its long-run stable population level at that point, so that λ1
00)0(
v
rcv
H
−=  and 
0)0( cP = .  Because more housing will be built with the boom, if the irrational expectations 
disappear, the long-run steady state is that new construction will then end forever and H(t) will 
remain at its highest level at the peak of the boom.  Prices will then satisfy  
r
tHvv
tP
)(
)( 10
λ−=  for the rest of time.  We let )0()()( HtHtH I −=  denote the incremental 
housing built during the boom, so that 
r
tHvctP I )()( 10
λ−=  after the bubble ends.   New 
housing built during the boom has a permanent, negative impact on prices after the boom is 
over, since this city begins at steady-state population levels, but the impact of the amount of 
housing built is independent of housing supply elasticity in the area.   
                                                 
8 See Mayer and Sinai (2007) for a recent examination of the possible role of adaptive expectations in the recent 
boom. 
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The demand side of the model is captured by the equation:    
(1’) 
)(
)()())()()((
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)( 10))((10 λ
λλλ
λ
++
−=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −•+++
−= ∫∞= −+− rr tgr tDvvdjtxtgtPeEr tDvvtP tx txrt , 
which must hold throughout the bubble.  The supply side continues to satisfy 
)()(10 tPtIcc =+ , which implies that 
11
1 )()/()()(
vrc
tHvrtg
tI I+
−+= λλλ .  Including the supply 
response into the pricing equation implies that ⎟⎠
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⎛ −+++= )(
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λ .  
Unsurprisingly, supply mutes the price response to optimistic beliefs.   
 During the first period, individuals believe that ε=)(tg .  In the second period, )(tg  
reflects the price growth during the first period.  In the third period, )(tg  reflects the price 
growth during the second period.  For the bubble to continue, not only must prices rises, but 
they must rise at an increasing rate.  Without ever-increasing optimism, new construction 
would cause prices to fall.   Yet, the ever-rising prices that are needed to fuel increasingly 
optimistic beliefs are only possible if housing supply is sufficiently inelastic and if people are 
sufficiently patient:     
Proposition 4:  If 
r
r
−< 1
2
λ , then no bubble can persist beyond the first time period. If 
r
r
−> 1
2
λ , then at time one, there exists a 1c , denoted *1c , where an initial bubble will persist if 
and only if *11 cc > .  If r
r
−< 1
2 2λ , then no bubble can persist beyond the second time period, but 
if 
r
r
−> 1
2 2λ , then there exists a second value of 1c , denoted **1c  which is greater than *1c , where 
an initial bubble can persist if and only if **11 cc > .   
 
Proposition 4 shows the connection between housing inelasticity and endogenous 
bubbles.  If housing supply is sufficiently elastic, then a temporary burst of irrational 
exuberance will be met with an abundant supply of new housing, which will in turn ensure 
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that housing price gains are less than those expected by the optimistic buyers.  The failure of 
reality to match expectations will quickly cause the bubble to pop.  However, if housing 
supply is inelastic, then prices will increase by more and these early, observed price increases 
cause the bubble to persist, because we have assumed adaptive expectations.   
 The degree of inelasticity needed for the bubble to survive increases over time, so that 
only places with extremely inelastic housing supplies can have long-lasting bubbles.  These 
effects mute the implication of the last section that housing bubbles will cause greater welfare 
losses through overbuilding in more elastic areas since the construction response to 
overoptimism is more severe.  The adaptive expectations model essentially endogenizes the 
degree of overoptimism (after the initial perturbation) and finds that self-sustaining 
overoptimism is more likely in inelastic areas.  This means that the overall social costs of 
bubbles may well be larger in places where housing is more inelastically supplied.  The 
connection between inelasticity and the housing produced by a bubble is explored in 
Proposition 5:  
 
Proposition 5:  If *11 cc < ,  so that the bubble lasts exactly one period, then the amount of 
excess housing built over the course of the bubble will be decreasing mononotically with 1c , 
and the price loss at the end of the bubble is monotonically increasing with 1c .  If 
**
11
*
1 ccc << , so that the bubble lasts exactly two periods, then housing built during the bubble 
and the price drop at the end of the bubble may either rise or fall with 1c . 
 
The first part of Proposition 5 shows that if the bubble lasts exactly one period, then 
places with more inelastic housing supply will have less housing built during the bubble.  This 
corresponds to the results of the last section, since a one-period bubble is essentially a wholly 
exogenous bubble.   In the case of a one-period bubble, the price drop at the end of the bubble 
will also be higher in more inelastic areas, just as we found in the previous section.   
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 The second result in the proposition shows that any clear implications disappear when 
the bubble last for two periods.  In that case, the degree of overoptimism in the second period 
will be increasing with housing supply inelasticity since the price increase during the first 
period is also increasing with inelasticity.   
 The core inequality that determines whether new construction rises with inelasticity is   
(2) 11
1
11
1
112
)(
2
11
1 vrc
v
vrc
v
ee
vrc
crr +
−+− −>⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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λλλλ .   
This obviously fails when r is sufficiently small.  When 1v  is sufficiently small, the inequality 
must hold.  More inelastic housing actually leads to more new construction over the course of 
the bubble in this case because more inelastic housing in the first period causes the price 
appreciation during that period to be higher, which in turn pushes up new construction during 
the second period.  This finding depends on our adaptive expectations assumption.  We intend 
this result to be interpreted as showing only the possibility that inelasticity can increase 
housing supply, not to claim generality for it.   
 The ambiguous effect of supply inelasticity on new construction is mirrored in the 
ambiguous effect of supply inelasticity on price declines at the end of one period.  More 
inelastic housing supply means higher prices during the second period of the bubble, but it 
also means less new housing supply.  These effects work in opposite direction in their impact 
on the price drop after the bubble, so the overall impact of inelasticity on price declines is 
ambiguous. 
 In sum, the model has two clear empirical predictions and is ambiguous on a number 
of other points.  During a bubble, price increases will be larger in more inelastic areas, and 
bubbles will be shorter and rarer in more elastic areas.  The implications about construction 
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inelasticity and housing production during the bubble are ambiguous, because more inelastic 
places have bigger bubbles but smaller construction responses during the bubble.  The impact 
of elasticity on welfare and on price and post-bubble price and investment declines also are 
ambiguous. 
 
III. Housing Market Data and Empirical Analysis 
Our empirical work is meant to examine the implications that the model has about the 
interaction between overoptimism and housing supply.  However, in no sense do we attempt to 
test for the existence of bubbles or any other form of market irrationality.  We begin with a 
description of our data and follow with an examination of how markets behaved across 
metropolitan areas facing different degrees of constraints to supply.  We also study three 
distinct periods of time, which are defined by the peaks and troughs in national price data.   
 
Data Description and Summary Statistics 
 The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) indices of metropolitan 
area-level prices are the foundation of the home price data we use.9  To create price levels, we 
begin by computing the price of the typical home as the weighted average of the median house 
value from the 2000 census across each county in the metropolitan area, where the weights are 
the proportion of households in the county.  That value is then scaled by the relevant change in 
the OFHEO index over time.  This then proxies for the price over time of the median quality 
home in 2000 in each market.  All prices are in constant 2007 dollars, unless explicitly noted. 
                                                 
9 The OFHEO series can be downloaded at the following URL:  http://www.ofheo.gov/hpi_download.aspx.   
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Housing permits serve as our measure of new quantity.  Permits are available at the 
county level from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.10  We aggregate across counties to create 
metropolitan area-level aggregates using 2003 definitions provided by the census.   
While the price and quantity series are available on a quarterly basis, we use annual 
data because our focus is on patterns over a cycle, not on higher frequency, seasonal effects.  
Annual data arguably are less noisy, too.  Moreover, when we want to compare prices to costs, 
we must use construction cost data that is only available annually.  All construction cost data 
are from the R.S. Means Company (2008).  We use their series for a modest quality, single 
family home that meets all building code requirements in each area.11     
These construction cost data only capture the cost of putting up the improvements.  
The total price of a home also should reflect land and land assembly costs, plus a profit for the 
builder.  What we term the minimum profitable production cost (MPPC) in each metropolitan 
area is computed as the sum of the following three components:  (a) physical construction 
costs (CC), which represent the cost of putting up the improvements;  (b) land and land 
assembly costs;  and (c) the gross margin needed to provide normal profits for the 
homebuilder entrepreneur.   
We calculate constructions costs, using the R.S. Means data for an 1,800ft2 economy-
quality home.  Land costs are much less readily available, as there is very little data on 
residential land sales.  Hence, we assume that these costs amount to one-fifth of the total value 
of the house (land plus improvements). This assumption seems likely to be conservative in the 
sense that true land costs probably are lower in many of the Sunbelt markets and exurbs, but it 
                                                 
10 Permit data are available at the following URL:  http://censtats.census.gov/bldg/bldgprmt.shtml.   
11 This series is for an ‘economy’ quality home.  It is the most modest of four different qualities of homes whose 
construction costs the R.S. Means Company tracks over time.  We have used these data in previous work.  
Glaeser and Gyourko (2003, 2005) report more detail on this series. 
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certainly understates land value in many urban cores and in the constrained markets on both 
coasts.  We assume that the typical gross profit margin for a homebuilder is 17%, as this yields 
net profits of 9%-11%, depending upon the overhead structure of the firm.  Thus, minimum 
profitable production cost (MPPC) is computed as MPPC = [(Construction Cost per Square 
Foot*1,800)/0.8]*1.17.12      
 Our primary measure of supply side conditions is taken from Saiz (2008).  Using GIS 
software and satellite imagery, Saiz (2008) measured the slope and elevation of every 90 
square meter parcel of land within 50 kilometers of the centroid of each metropolitan area.  
Because it is very difficult to build on land with a slope of 15 degrees or more, we use the 
share of land within the 50 kilometer radius area that has a slope of less than 15 degrees as our 
proxy for elasticity conditions.  Saiz (2008) first determines the area lost to oceans, the Gulf of 
Mexico, and the Great Lakes using data from the United States Geographic Service (USGS).  
Land area lost to rivers and lakes is not excluded in these calculations.  The USGS’ Digital 
Elevation Model then is used to determine the fraction of the remaining land area that is less 
steeply sloped than 15 degrees.  This measure of buildable land is based solely on the physical 
geography of each metropolitan area, and so is independent of market conditions.13 
 Given the literature on endogenous zoning, the more plausibly exogenous nature of 
Saiz’s physical constraint measure leads us to favor it over the other primary supply-side 
proxy we experimented with, the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index (WRLURI) 
                                                 
12 The greatest measurement error in this rough estimate of the minimum cost at which housing could be 
produced almost certainly arises from our underlying land value assumption.  Data on residential land prices 
across markets is very scarce in the cross section and is unavailable over time.  Our assumption is based on a rule 
of thumb used in the building industry, but conditions do vary substantially across markets as noted just above, 
and they also could have over time.  We discuss this issue more below when this variable is used in our empirical 
analysis. 
13 The use of geography in this context follows in the tradition of Hoxby (2000).  In the urban field, see also 
Duranton, et. al. (2008), Holmes and Lee (2008) and Strange and Rosenthal (2008). 
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from Gyourko, Saiz and Summers (2008).14  This is a measure of the strictness of the local 
regulatory environment based on results from a 2005 survey of over 2,000 localities across the 
country.  It was created as an index using factor analysis and is standardized to have a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one, with a higher value of the index connoting a more 
restrictive regulatory environment.  While we prefer the geographic constraint for our 
purposes, the two variables are highly (negatively) correlated, so that a city with a smaller 
share of developable land tends to have a higher Wharton index value.15 
 We work with annual house price and quantity data from 1982-2007, with 1982 being 
the first year we are able to reliably match series across our metropolitan areas.  Table 1 
reports recent values on these variables.  The first column provides 2007 prices of the median 
quality home (as of 2000) in each metropolitan area.  As expected, there is a wide range of 
price conditions across markets.  The mean value is $234,168, with a relatively large standard 
deviation of $141,822.  The price at the top of the interquartile range is double that at the 
bottom ($275,101 versus $134,276), but even that does not capture the extreme values in the 
tails.  The metropolitan area in the 10th percentile of the distribution had a home price of 
$116,205 versus $447,962 for the area in the 90th percentile.  The minimum price is $103,013, 
and the maximum price is $721,694.   
                                                 
14 The literature on whether zoning is endogenous is a lengthy one.  See McDonald and McMillan (1991) and 
Wallace (1988) for two early influential pieces on this topic.   
15 The simple correlation between the index and the geographic constraint variables across the 78 metropolitan 
areas for which we have at least one community response to the Wharton survey is -0.40.  For metropolitan areas 
with multiple communities responding to the survey, we use the mean index value across those communities 
when computing this correlation.  Given the strong correlation, it is not very surprising that our regression results 
reported below are qualitatively similar whether we use the geography- or regulation-based variable below.  [The 
signs are reversed, of course.]  Those results are available upon request, and the underlying micro data from the 
Wharton survey can be accessed at 
http://real.wharton.upenn.edu/~gyourko/Wharton_residential_land_use_reg.htm..  We also examined data from 
Saks (2008), which created another index of supply-side restrictiveness based on other previous research mostly 
surveys.  Her series also is strongly correlated with Saiz (2008) and Gyourko, Saiz and Summers (2008), but it 
covers many fewer metropolitan areas (about 40). 
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 Minimum profitable production costs, also as of 2007, are reported in the second 
column of Table 1.  There are only five metropolitan areas for which this value exceeds 
$200,000, and the maximum value is only $224,641.16  The mean is $166,386 and the standard 
deviation is a relatively small $20,032, so production costs do not vary across areas nearly as 
much as prices do.  Obviously, there are many markets in which prices are far above our 
calculated MPPC values.   
 Figure 1 illustrates some of the time series variation in these data in its plot of the 
average ratio of price-to-MPPC across the 79 metropolitan areas in our sample.  This plot 
indicates that the prices were significantly below our estimate of minimum profitable 
production costs for much of the 1980s.  Indeed, it was only during the recent boom that 
average prices rose above construction costs.   
 Because the OFHEO-based repeat sales index measures appreciation on existing 
homes that sell, while our estimate of production costs is for a new house, the comparison is of 
prices on older homes with the costs of new product. Hence, it is not so surprising to see prices 
below our estimate of MPPC.  While this bias is unavoidable in any comparison of new home 
costs to those based on repeat sales indexes, it does suggest that any positive gap between 
prices and production costs is a conservative measure of that difference.  That a large gap 
clearly developed between 1996-2005 suggests that the recent boom may have been different 
in certain respects.17  
                                                 
16 The New York metropolitan area has the highest construction costs.  The four other areas with costs above 
$200,000 are in the Boston and San Francisco Bay areas. 
17 Obviously, we can mechanically have the price-to-cost ratio be near one in the early 1980s if we were to 
assume that land constituted a lesser than 20 percent share of overall property value.  But, as just noted, there is 
no reason to believe that this ratio could not ever be less than one.  Our focus here is on the time series pattern, 
and we do not believe there is any reasonable chance the upward slope could be explained by errors in our 
underlying assumptions for the MPPC.     
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With respect to the supply side, there is considerable dispersion in Saiz’s series on the 
fraction of developable land area.  The sample mean for this variable is 81.6%, with a standard 
deviation of 19.8%.  The 10th percentile value is only 51%, compared to a 90th percentile value 
of 100% developable land.  The most physically constrained metropolitan area is Oxnard-
Thousand Oaks-Ventura (20.7% developable land), while 13 markets are completely 
unconstrained by this measure (e.g., Dayton, OH, and Wichita, KS, which are off the coasts 
and have no steeply sloped land parcels within 50 kilometers of their centroids). 
To gain initial insight into how house prices and quantities vary with supply elasticity 
conditions over our full sample period, we estimated specifications (3) and (4) below, which 
allow us to see whether national price and quantity cycles generate differential local impacts 
depending upon local supply elasticity conditions.  After controlling for metropolitan area and 
time (year) fixed effects in the price and quantity specifications, the local effects can be seen 
in the coefficients on the interaction of the developable land share variable in each market 
(DevShri) with the (log) average annual national house price across the 79 areas in our sample 
(PriceUS,t).  Specifically, we estimate 
 
(3) log Pricei,t = α + β*Yeart + γ*MSAi + δ*(DevShri*Log[PriceUS,t]) + εi,t 
 
(4) log Permitsi,t = α’ + β’*Yeart + γ’*MSAi + δ’*(DevShri*Log[PriceUS,t]) + ε’i,t , 
 
where i indexes the metropolitan areas, t represents each year from 1982-2007, and ε is the 
standard error term.   
The coefficients δ and δ’ indicate how price and quantity vary with the degree of 
supply side elasticity, controlling for the state of the cycle (with average prices), as well as 
general year and market effects.  The results from equation (3) yield a negative value for δ (of 
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-0.0228;  std. err. = 0.0009), which implies that prices move much less over the national cycle 
in more elastic markets.  The results from equation (4) yield δ’=0.0124 (std. err. = 0.0028), 
indicating that permits move much more over the national cycle in more elastic places.18  
These basic results both suggest that our geographic constraint variable is proxying for supply 
side conditions as we had intended and that price and quantity responses vary as our model 
predicts.  We now turn from these summary statistics to analyses of specific boom and bust 
periods in the housing market.   
 
IV. The 1982-1996 Cycle 
 The bulk of variation in housing prices is local, not national, but there still are periods 
when there is enough co-movement across areas that there are recognizable national housing 
cycles.  Between 1982 and 1989, three-quarters of our metropolitan areas had nominal price 
growth greater than 21% over the eight year period.  Inflation was relatively high during the 
1980s, but real appreciation throughout the sample still averaged 14.6% over this time span.     
 As Figure 2 shows, 1989 was the peak of average housing prices in our sample 
between 1982 and 1996, so it is the natural peak of a housing cycle.  Averaged across all of 
our markets, prices only started to rise consistently again in 1997, so we will define the 1989-
1996 period as the housing bust on the other side of this cycle.  Over this latter time period, 
half of our markets (40 out of 79) experienced real price declines, although barely 10 percent 
(10 out of 79) experienced nominal price drops.  Table 2 reports more detail on the 
distribution of real and nominal price growth over time.19      
                                                 
18 Each specification is estimated using 2,212 observations (79 metro areas over 28 year).  For the price equation, 
the R2=0.91;  for the quantity equation, the R2=0.85.   
19 Even over this national boom-bust cycle, the bulk of year-to-year variation in price changes was local.  For 
example, if we regress annual percentage real price growth in each market on year dummies, we find that those 
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Accompanying the boom and bust of housing prices is an analogous change in housing 
production.  Figure 3 depicts the movement in new residential permits issue over time.  The 
plot is of the yearly sum of all housing permits issued in our 79 market sample. This quantity 
series shows the same basic rise, decline and rise as the price series, although permits seem to 
peak and trough earlier than prices.  Perhaps this is because builders are able forecast price 
changes, but that is an issue for future research. 
Was the boom-bust cycle in housing prices a bubble or a response to fundamentals? 
The national economy was doing reasonably well in the mid- to late 1980s, and interest rates 
and inflation had fallen from their dramatic heights during the early 1980s.  While there were 
observers in the 1980s who called the price gains a bubble, the fact that real conditions were 
changing dramatically made any such claims highly debatable.  The best case for a bubble, at 
least in some markets, was that prices fell so dramatically over a short period of time after the 
boom without any obviously comparable changes in fundamentals.  
For example, real prices in the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale metropolitan area 
rose by 67 percent between 1984 and 1989.  Over the next five years, real values then declined 
33 percent.  We understand those who find it hard to look at Los Angeles’ prices in both 1989 
and 1994 and to think that these dramatic changes in prices were actually driven by changes in 
real features of southern California.20  In retrospect, it is just as possible to take the view that 
1994 was unduly pessimistic as it is to take the view that 1989 was unduly optimistic.  In 
either case, something seems to have been amiss with standard rational pricing models, as 
discussed in the Introduction.   
                                                                                                                                                         
dummies explain only 14% of the variation in housing price appreciation.  Still, this implies there is a meaningful 
amount of national variation, possibly driven by changes in interest rates, the national economy, demographics 
and perhaps even nationwide beliefs about the future of the housing market. 
20 See Case (1994) and Case and Mayer (1995) for early investigations into this issue for the Los Angeles and 
Boston markets. 
 
 
28
While one cannot know for sure whether there was a bubble during this time period (in 
at least some markets), we can determine whether the data are consistent with the key 
implications of the theory presented above.  One of the key predictions of our models is that 
markets with highly elastic supply sides are much less likely to have ‘bubbles’.  We will 
examine this implication first by comparing the price gains over the 1982-1989 period in 
elastic and inelastic cities.  Dividing the sample in two at the median value for the share of 
developable land based on geographic constraints (which is 88%) finds a large difference in 
real price appreciation between the less versus more elastic areas.  On average, the relatively 
inelastic markets appreciated nearly five times more in real terms (23.2% versus 5.0%) than 
the relatively elastic markets over this period.   
Regressing each metropolitan area’s price appreciation on our supply side proxy finds 
a statistically and economically significant relationship in which a more elastic supply side is 
associated with materially lower real price growth during this boom.  These results are 
presented in column one of Table 3.  The coefficient value of -0.67 (std. err. = 0.17) implies 
that a one standard deviation change in the share of developable land (which equals 20 
percentage points and corresponds to a move from the 25th to 50th or the 50th to 75th percentiles 
of the distribution for this variable) is associated with about a 13 percentage point reduction in 
real appreciation during this time period.  This finding is consistent with the model’s 
implication that more inelastic places will have bigger price changes during bubbles, but it is 
also compatible with the view that the rise in prices in the 1980s was driven by fundamentals.  
Inelasticity should produce bigger price increases, whether the inelasticity is driven by rational 
or irrational forces.   
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Perhaps the biggest challenge to the implication of this simple bivariate regression is 
that it reflects demand-side rather than supply-side differences across markets.  To investigate 
this further, we include different measures of housing demand as controls.  Two amenity 
variables—warmth (mean January temperature) and dryness (mean annual precipitation)—
were used.  While these particular variables don’t change over time, demand for them might 
have, so they provide a natural way of controlling for changes in demand.  We also explored a 
variety of economic variables including the share of the population with college degrees in 
1980, the level of real income in 1980 as measured by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and 
the growth in that income (between 1982 and 1989 for this particular regression).  The initial 
level of educational achievement and 1980 income are static, of course, and should only 
matter if they are correlated with changes in local economies over the 1980s.  Change in BEA 
real income gives us a measure of income growth.   
Column 2 of Table 3 reports coefficient estimates on our supply side proxy based on a 
specification that includes these demand controls.  The coefficient falls to -0.52 (std. err. = 
0.17), but remains statistically significant.21  There was much heterogeneity in house price 
growth across markets during the 1980s boom.  Supply side conditions certainly do not 
explain all that cross sectional variation, but they can account for a significant fraction.  
Essentially, a one standard deviation change in the degree of supply-side constraint is 
associated with a 0.3 standard deviation change in real price appreciation during the boom.   
The last two regressions reported in Table 3 examine quantity, using the logarithm of 
the number of permits between 1982 and 1989 as the dependent variable.  In this case, we also 
control for the logarithm of the number of homes in the area in 1980 and the logarithm of the 
                                                 
21 It is the economic variables, both 1980 income and its growth from 1982-1989, which are the most highly 
significant and account for the attenuation of the coefficient on the developable land share.  All results are 
available upon request. 
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land area of the metropolitan area.   The logarithmic formulation means that we can interpret 
these results as representing permits relative to the initial stock of housing or permits relative 
to land area.  In general, the relationship between the increase in the number of housing units 
and the supply side proxy is less robust.  The baseline regression finds a statistically 
insignificant coefficient of the wrong sign (column 3).  Adding in controls in the next 
specification, changes the coefficient to 0.007 (std. err. = 0.003), which means that a one 
standard deviation higher fraction of developable land is associated with a 0.14 log point 
increase in our permitting variable, which amounts to just over 0.16 standard deviations for 
that variable.  Thus, there is modest evidence consistent with Proposition 3, which suggests 
that more elastic places build more housing during the boom.   
 These results indicate that the more inelastic markets experienced a much larger price 
response and a somewhat smaller quantity response during the boom period of the 1980s.  The 
distributional data reported in Table 4 yield more insight into the full extent of the ability of 
elasticity to explain price growth variation during this time period.  We split the sample into 
three groups based on our developable land proxy for elasticity.22   
The mean differences across the groups are very large, as expected.  Being relatively 
inelastic certainly is no guarantee of high price growth.  One always needs strong demand for 
that, and not all areas with relatively low shares of developable land have growing demand.  
However, being relatively elastic really does seem to have limited the ability of a market to 
experience a truly large price boom during this period.  The data in Table 4 show that almost 
none of the most elastic metropolitan areas experienced real price appreciation of at least 33%, 
                                                 
22 The most elastic third of markets is slightly larger because of lumpiness at the cut-off margin for the share of 
developable land.  Nothing is affected if we move those marginal metros into the middle group. 
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which is the lower bound for the top quartile of markets.  During this decade, really high price 
growth over a long period of time required some type of constraint on development.     
 
The 1989-1996 Bust  
 The case for interpreting 1982-1989 as a bubble in those inelastic places is made 
stronger by the enormous mean reversion over the next seven years.  Figure 4 plots the price 
changes between 1990 and 1996 on the price growth between 1982 and 1989.23  Overall, the 
correlation is -59 percent.  Whatever was pushing prices up in the 1980s seems to have 
disappeared in the 1990s, and it is challenging to identify real economic factors that can 
explain that change. 
 Mean differences in price appreciation between relatively inelastic and elastic areas 
were much smaller during the housing bust.  The forty markets with developable land shares 
below the sample median did suffer larger real price declines on average, but the gap is not 
particularly large:  -7.9% for the relatively constrained markets versus -2.7% for the 
unconstrained group.  There are more extreme declines among the inelastic set.  One quarter 
of them suffered real price declines of at least -26%.  The analogous figure for the elastic 
markets is only -9%. 
 The regression results are not nearly as robust as those for the boom period.  These are 
reported in Table 5, which replicates Table 3 for the 1989-1996 time frame and then adds two 
specifications.  The baseline bivariate regression reported in column one yields a small, 
positive coefficient.  However, including the demand controls reduces its magnitude and 
eliminates all statistical significance (column 2).  In the third specification, we include a 
control for price growth during the 1982-1989 boom period and the interaction between the 
                                                 
23 We use non-overlapping years to minimize the mean reversion that would be created by pure measurement 
error in 1989 prices. 
 
 
32
degree of price growth during the boom and the amount of available land.  This makes the 
supply elasticity proxy highly statistically significant (t=-5.8), so that on average, the extent of 
real price changes falls with supply elasticity.  The coefficient on the interaction term is small 
enough so that the marginal effect of an added percentage point of developable land is 
negative throughout most of the range of the data.24   
While there is substantial mean reversion on average, the positive coefficient on the 
interaction term indicates that there is less mean reversion in more elastic markets.  The 
coefficient magnitudes imply that there is mean reversion even in markets with 100% 
developable land shares, but this still is consistent with the implications of the model above 
that the post-bubble drops in house prices should be greater in the more inelastic markets.  
The first two permit regressions for this time period yield results similar to those 
reported in Table 3.  There is modest evidence in favor of more elastic markets experiencing a 
larger quantity response during the bust.  The last permit regression again controls for price 
growth during the previous boom and its interaction with the share of developable land.  On 
average, as the model predicts, greater real price appreciation in a metropolitan area during the 
boom is associated with less permitting intensity during the bust.  However, the positive 
coefficient on the interaction term indicates that this negative impact is weakened the greater 
is the elasticity of supply.25   
While the average effect of the supply side is very small (and negative), the combined 
effect with the interaction term finds that the derivative of permitting intensity during the bust 
with respect to the share of developable land is positive as long as real appreciation during the 
                                                 
24 The relevant derivative turns positive only if price growth during the previous boom was above 58.6%.  That is 
near the 90th percentile of the distribution for that variable. 
25 The marginal effect actually turns positive for markets with developable land shares above 88%, which is near 
the sample median for that variable.  Hence, in the more elastically supplied markets, a small increase in the 
previous boom is associated with more, not less, permitting. 
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boom exceeded 5.4%.  This is well below sample average price growth of 14.6% 
(median=8.2%, with a 25th percentile value of -5.4%) for that period, so this specification 
indicates that the quantity response was higher the more elastic the market, as long as the 
market has enough underlying demand growth that its prices actually rose in real terms during 
the boom period.   
 
V. The Post-1996 Boom 
 
 In some ways, the years after 1996 mirrored the boom of the 1980s.  However, the 
post-1996 boom was bigger and more widespread.  Every one of our 79 markets experienced 
real price gains between 1996 and 2006.  Mean real price growth over this period was 57.9%.   
However, the price gains continued to be much higher in more inelastic places on average.  
The average price appreciation difference between areas above or below the sample median 
amount of developable land is a whopping 47 percentage points.  Real price appreciation 
averaged 81% in the relatively inelastic markets and 34% in the relatively elastic markets.  
Table 6’s breakdown of the distribution of real price growth for each third of our metropolitan 
areas based on their share of developable land further confirms this picture. 
Table 7’s regression results for this period show a very strong negative relation 
between price appreciation and our supply side proxy.  The coefficient from the second 
specification that includes all our demand controls is one quarter larger than that reported in 
Table 3 for the 1980s boom.  Supply elasticity correlates strongly with the extent of price 
growth in booms.  The findings in the final two columns of this table again show there is more 
construction in elastic places in booms.  The magnitudes also are similar to those reported in 
Table 3 from the 1980s boom.   
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However, there is one striking way in which the post-1996 boom differed from the 
boom of the 1980s: there was exceptional price growth in a modest number of relatively or 
highly elastic places.  Of the 19 metropolitan areas that experienced at least a doubling of real 
prices (100%+) over this period, one (Orlando-Kissimmee) is in the most elastic group and 
five are in the middle group (Fresno, Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, Stockton, Tampa-St. 
Petersburg-Clearwater, and Washington-Arlington-Alexandria).   
One possible explanation of this fact is that supply had become much less elastic in 
some of the areas that we classified as elastic based on Saiz’s (2008) data.  To check this, we 
look at permitting intensity.  Figure 5 plots the sample average across our 79 metropolitan 
areas of annual permits as a share of their 1990 housing stocks.  Permitting intensity clearly 
cycles, with permits as a fraction of the stock in the middle of our sample period being as low 
as 1.1% in the depth of a bust and as high as 2.6% in 2005.   
Figures 6-11 then plot the analogous data for the six aforementioned markets that 
experienced huge real price growth in the recent boom, but are not constrained by our supply 
side measure.  In each market other than Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, permitting 
intensity was as high or higher in the recent boom than in the 1980s boom. In the Phoenix and 
Orlando areas, annual permitting reached as high as 6% of the 1990 stock.  And, permitting 
intensity did not fall until late in the recent boom, even for the Washington market.  While 
permitting intensity was not high by national standards in the Washington market, it was in the 
others.  Hence, it is difficult to make a case that anyone reasonably thought these markets were 
becoming inelastic in nature.   
 Figure 12 then plots the mean real house price-to-MPPC ratio for the Orlando 
metropolitan area.  For two decades prior to 2003 when this ratio hit 1.22, prices in this market 
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hovered within 10-15% of our estimate of minimum profitable production costs.  It then 
proceeded to grow by another 39% before peaking at 1.70 in 2006.  As Figure 7 above shows, 
Orlando’s permitting intensity had fallen between 1999-2001, but was increasing sharply 
between 2001 and 2003 and would reach its all-time high in 2005.  Thus, land in this and a 
few other similar markets looks to be becoming increasingly expensive at the same time that 
new supply is accelerating.  This well may be a more profound signal of a bubble than any 
other of which we are aware.  
 Proposition 5 above predicts that booms, to the extent they exist at all in elastic 
markets, will be shorter than in inelastic markets.  To see whether the data are consistent with 
this implication of the model, we measured the length of a market’s boom in the 1996-2006 
period as follows.  The start of the boom is defined by the first year subsequent to 1996 in 
which the area’s price-to-MPPC ratio had increased by at least 20% over its 1996 value.  The 
20% number was chosen because we believe it is large enough to ensure that house prices 
really have risen substantially relative to fundamental production costs in a way that cannot be 
accounted for by measurement error.  The length of the boom is then determined by the 
number of years before the price-to-MPPC ratio begins to turn down.   
 Among the most elastic third of markets with the highest shares of developable land, 
eleven saw their price-to-MPPC ratio rise at least 20% above its 1996 level for at least one 
year.  The mean number of years before that ratio began to decline was 1.7 for this group.  By 
this definition, booms last for less than two years in the most elastic markets.  Naturally, a 
greater share of the most inelastic third of markets experienced a boom according to this 
metric.  Among the 20 that did, the mean number of years before a downturn in this ratio was 
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4.1.  Thus, booms last much longer in the more inelastic markets, as predicted by Proposition 
5.26 
VI. Conclusion 
Housing price volatility can be quite high, and in some cases it appears to be too high 
to be explained by changes in the fundamentals of the housing market.  This seems to suggest 
that financial market wisdom regarding bubbles and overoptimism can be imported into 
housing economics.  However, it is critical to incorporate the supply side when analyzing 
housing markets.  As a factual matter, the supply of housing is not fixed, and the possibility of 
oversupply of housing during a boom is one of the primary ways in which housing bubbles 
may create substantial welfare losses. 
 In this paper, we presented a simple model of housing bubbles with endogenous 
housing supply.  On some matters, the model gave clear predictions.  Housing prices should 
increase more during bubbles in places where housing supply is inelastic.  Bubbles should be 
more common and longer in places where supply is inelastic.  On other issues, the 
implications of the model were less clear, including with respect to the impact of bubbles on 
the amount of new construction and social welfare.   
 We then examined price and quantity increases during the two large national price 
swings of the past 25 years.  During both price booms, price increases were higher in places 
where housing supply was more inelastic because of steep topography, just as the model 
suggests.  Moreover, most elastic places seem to have avoided having a bubble entirely during 
the 1980s.  Over the last decade, there were more modestly elastic places that also experienced 
                                                 
26 The mean length of boom for the 15 markets from the middle third of the developable land share distribution 
that experienced at least a 20% rise in their price-to-MPPC ratio is 3.3 years, in between the most and least elastic 
markets. 
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big price increases, but as the model suggests, the housing price booms in elastic places were 
much shorter in duration than those in inelastic places.  
 The empirical results on quantities built during booms were more ambiguous, just like 
the model’s predictions.  During the 1980s, once we controlled for other area-level 
characteristics, more elastic places built more.  The same thing is even more true over the past 
ten years.   
 Our results on elasticity were weakest during the bust period.  While the level of mean 
reversion during the bust is enormous, there is little correlation between price declines during 
the bust and the degree of elasticity.  Places with bigger price growth during the 1980s had 
less construction in the early 1990s, but this effect was muted in more elastic areas.  More 
generally, it is hard to really predict what will happen to elastic areas that experienced price 
booms over the last five years.  In the past, places that elastic did not experience price booms.  
However, a reasonable expectation might be that prices in these elastic areas are likely to 
continue their fall downward, returning to minimum profitable production cost levels, which 
have been the historical norm in these areas. 
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Metropolitan Area State House Price Production Costs
Akron OH $130,611 $165,975
Albuquerque NM $208,903 $153,136
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton PA $215,976 $176,832
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta GA $187,799 $154,493
Austin-Round Rock TX $180,222 $137,373
Bakersfield CA $219,291 $181,320
Baltimore-Towson MD $275,101 $159,190
Baton Rouge LA $143,864 $145,516
Birmingham-Hoover AL $136,861 $153,345
Boston-Quincy MA $322,721 $200,214
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk CT $498,022 $187,479
Buffalo-Niagara Falls NY $122,500 $175,997
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord NC $173,802 $138,626
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet IL $259,812 $194,682
Cincinnati-Middletown OH $143,263 $159,086
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor OH $139,847 $172,134
Colorado Springs CO $203,942 $159,295
Columbia SC $137,075 $137,478
Columbus OH $149,531 $161,904
Dallas-Plano-Irving TX $136,368 $144,680
Dayton OH $120,640 $155,954
Denver-Aurora CO $217,760 $162,739
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn MI $107,097 $180,485
Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield Beach FL $303,956 $151,988
Fort Wayne IN $103,013 $154,180
Fort Worth-Arlington TX $115,798 $140,714
Fresno CA $244,810 $184,452
Gary IN $140,650 $172,656
Grand Rapids-Wyoming MI $131,518 $143,219
Greensboro-High Point NC $134,276 $137,478
Harrisburg-Carlisle PA $166,348 $166,393
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown TX $125,962 $152,405
Indianapolis-Carmel IN $135,988 $160,860
Jacksonville FL $199,607 $145,098
Kansas City MO $135,415 $176,414
Las Vegas-Paradise NV $283,653 $174,013
Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway AR $120,840 $147,916
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale CA $514,650 $185,287
Louisville-Jefferson County KY $133,783 $157,520
Memphis TN $114,848 $149,378
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall FL $330,573 $155,432
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis WI $190,099 $176,310
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington MN $216,199 $192,594
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin TN $176,949 $150,735
Newark-Union NJ $395,231 $193,325
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner LA $159,207 $151,570
New York-White Plains-Wayne NY $720,863 $224,641
Table 1: House Prices and Production Costs, 2007
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Metropolitan Area State House Price Production Costs
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward CA $514,768 $209,922
Oklahoma City OK $110,531 $141,549
Omaha-Council Bluffs NE $125,899 $156,894
Orlando-Kissimmee FL $230,099 $154,597
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura CA $513,529 $182,886
Philadelphia PA $219,469 $196,665
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottdale AZ $258,467 $154,180
Pittsburgh PA $116,960 $170,360
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River RI $264,245 $182,051
Raleigh-Cary NC $203,291 $137,895
Richmond VA $198,628 $153,762
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario CA $332,515 $182,364
Rochester NY $122,900 $170,673
St. Louis MO $143,323 $178,084
Salt Lake City UT $273,874 $150,944
San Antonio TX $118,524 $142,384
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos CA $447,962 $181,216
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City CA $721,694 $209,922
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara CA $678,274 $209,922
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett WA $417,512 $178,919
Stockton CA $264,884 $186,018
Tacoma WA $289,587 $176,101
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater FL $192,969 $158,668
Toledo OH $116,206 $168,689
Tucson AZ $222,790 $149,378
Tulsa OK $107,404 $138,313
Vallejo-Fairfield CA $342,161 $194,055
Warren-Troy-Farmington Hills MI $176,499 $174,118
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria DC $403,374 $170,255
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Boynton Beach FL $295,560 $155,432
Wichita KS $105,162 $144,785
Wilmington DE $245,042 $181,007
Table 1: House Prices and Production Costs, 2007 (continued)
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Table 2:  Summary Statistics on Percentage Price Changes Over Time 
79 Metropolitan Area Sample 
 1982-1989 1989-1996 1996-2006 
 Nominal Real($07) Nominal Real($07) Nominal Real(*$07)
Mean 47.2% 14.6% 19.8% -5.3% 100.0% 57.9% 
Std. Dev. 42.0% 32.6% 19.3% 16.5% 60.2% 47.9% 
10th  -1.7% -23.5% -6.8% -28.3% 40.7% 11.0% 
25th  21.5% -5.4% 4.6% -17.8% 49.8% 18.0% 
50th  39.1% 8.2% 21.7% -3.7% 69.5% 33.9% 
75th  70.9% 33.0% 32.5% 5.8% 146.1% 94.3% 
90th  114.8% 67.1% 40.7% 12.8% 203.3% 140.1% 
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Real Price Appreciation Real Price Appreciation Log of Total Permits Log of Total Permits
1982-1989 1982-1989 1982-89 1982-89
Share of Buildable Land -0.67 -0.52 -0.005 0.007
(0.17) (0.17) (0.003) (0.003)
Other Covariates Percent College Grads Log Land Area Percent College Grads
January Temperature Log 1980 Stock January Temperature
Personal Income 1980 Personal Income 1980
 Income Growth 1982-89  Income Growth 1982-89
Precipitation Precipitation
Log Land Area
Log 1980 Stock
N 79 79 79 79
R-Squared 0.17 0.58 0.58 0.79
Table 3: Real Price Appreciation, Building, and Supply Conditions: 1980's Boom 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Distribution of Real Price Growth in the 1980s Boom 
 by Degree of Supply Constraint 
 n=26 n=25 n=28 
 Most Inelastic Middle Third Most Elastic 
Mean 28.6% 12.5% 3.4% 
Std. Dev. 36.8% 28.2% 28.2% 
10th  -9.0% -24.0% -30.5% 
25th  -2.3% -5.4% -18.3% 
50th  23.2% 8.7% 5.0% 
75th  64.1% 33.8% 12.5% 
90th  86.1% 50.8% 33.0% 
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Real Price Appreciation Real Price Appreciation Real Price Appreciation Log of Total Permits Log of Total Permits Log of Total Permits
1989-1996 1989-1996 1989-1996 1990-96 1990-96 1990-96
Share of Buildable Land 0.24 -0.05 -0.41 0.0037 0.0065 -0.0020
(0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.0028) (0.0037) (0.0036)
Real Price Growth -0.86 -0.0328
1982-1989 (0.12) (0.0063)
Interaction of 1982-89 0.007 0.00037
Price Growth and (0.001) (0.00008)
Buildable Land Share
Other Covariates Percent College Grads Percent College Grads Log Land Area Percent College Grads Percent College Grads
January Temperature January Temperature Log 1990 Stock January Temperature January Temperature
Personal Income 1980 Personal Income 1980 Personal Income 1980 Personal Income 1980
 Income Growth 1989-96  Income Growth 1989-96  Income Growth 1989-96  Income Growth 1989-96
Precipitation Precipitation Precipitation Precipitation
Log Land Area Log Land Area
Log 1990 Stock Log 1990 Stock
N 79 79 79 78 78 78
R-Squared 0.09 0.47 0.82 0.65 0.68 0.77
Table 5: Real Price Appreciation, Building, and Supply Conditions: 1990's Bust
 
 
 
 
Table 6:  Distribution of Real Price Growth in the 1996-2006 Boom  
by Degree of Supply Constraint 
 n=26 n=25 n=28 
 Most Inelastic Middle Third Most Elastic 
Mean 93.9% 53.8% 28.2% 
Std. Dev. 50.4% 39.7% 26.3% 
10th  13.5% 15.3% 6.2% 
25th  49.4% 24.7% 12.6% 
50th  98.6% 36.2% 18.4% 
75th  140.2% 86.6% 30.1% 
90th  146.5% 115.1% 67.0% 
 
 
 
 
46
 
 
Real Price Appreciation Real Price Appreciation Log of Total Permits Log of Total Permits
1996-2006 1996-2006 1997-2006 1997-2006
Share of Buildable Land -1.54 -0.77 0.0040 0.0071
(0.21) (0.23) (0.0030) (0.0035)
Other Covariates Percent College Grads Log Land Area Percent College Grads
January Temperature Log 1990 Stock January Temperature
Personal Income 1980 Personal Income 1980
 Income Growth 1996-06  Income Growth 1996-06
Precipitation Precipitation
Log Land Area
Log 1990 Stock
N 79 79 78 78
R-Squared 0.40 0.63 0.67 0.79
Table 7: Real Price Appreciation, Building, and Supply Conditions: 1996-2006 Boom
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Figure 3: Aggregate Permits Over 79 Metros
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Figure 4: Mean Reversion in Prices, 79 Metro Average
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Figure 5: Average Permitting Intensity, 79 Metro Sample
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Figure 6: Average Permitting Intensity, Fresno
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Figure 7: Average Permitting Intensity, Orlando
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Figure 8: Average Permitting Intensity, Phoenix
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Figure 9: Average Permitting Intensity, Stockton
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Figure 10: Average Permitting Intensity, Tampa
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Figure 11: Average Permitting Intensity, Washington DC
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Figure 12: Orlando Price-to-MPPC Ratio
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Appendix 1: Proofs of Propositions 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  If ε+>+ 0)( cjtP  for all positive j, then there construction 
levels will be greater than 1/ cε  for all positive j, which implies an infinite amount of 
construction and an infinite city size which means that there will be more homes for sale 
than buyers and the equilibrium price will be zero which contradicts the initial 
assumption.   
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  During the bubble:  
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, all of which are unambiguously positive.  As the length of 
the bubble increases, the impact of the shock on investment and prices declines, but the 
impact of the shock on the size of the housing stock increases.  Differentiation gives us 
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The cross partial derivatives with respect to the duration of the bubble are 
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Proof of Proposition 3: For kj ≤ , differentiation yields: 0
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Further differentiation then yields that:  
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The cross partial effect on the housing supply equals 
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which is negative if and only if 
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goes to zero, the right hand side of the expression also goes to zero so the condition must 
hold.  As 1c  gets arbitrarily large, the right hand side of the equation goes to r
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and the left hand side of the equation goes to zero so the equation must fail.   
 
This equation must hold for high enough values of k, since 
k
e k 1−γ   goes to infinity as k 
gets sufficiently large.   
 
 
At time k, the impact on housing supply must be positive, since the housing supply is still 
determined by investment during the boom.  The change in price when the bubble ends, 
denoted PΔ  is equal to 
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θλ , which is increasing in θ  and 1c .  The cross effect 
is also positive.  
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Proof of Proposition 4: During a period when beliefs about the future are held constant, 
the equilibrium is characterized by the three equations for housing stock, investment and 
prices: 
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lower than expectations and the bubble will start to unravel.   
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Again, this means that there exists of value of  1c  such that the inequality holds with 
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equality and for values of 1c  above (below) this amount the inequality holds (fails) 
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Proof of Proposition 5: If *11 cc < , then the bubble will only last one period and the total 
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If the bubble ends at period one, then prices will fall from λ
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This inequality will always hold if r is sufficiently small.  As 1v  becomes arbitrarily 
large, the inequality converges to ( )( ) ( )( )( )λλ λλλλ −− −−+>+− errrer 121 , which can 
certainly fail.   
   
